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1. Background 
1. Background 
 
This report outlines main trends in employees’ financial participation in Latvia 
including historical, socioeconomic and legal background. A special emphasis is placed 
on privatization during the transition period which shaped an environment for 
employees’ financial participation and influenced the current state of employee share 
ownership and profit-sharing. Attitudes of social partners and the government will be 
addressed. The report will show why the transition process lead to a low level of 
employees’ financial participation and the indifference and ignorance of policy makers 
concerning the development of financial participation.  
 
a) History 
Financial participation has had a relatively short history in Latvia. In 1930s, during the 
first independence of the Republic of Latvia, the co-operative movement was strong in 
agriculture including co-operatives for farming and for processing agricultural 
products. There were also so called crafts co-operatives in rural areas and in cities 
(Aizsilnieks, 1968, p. 56-58). In the Soviet period, consumer and housing co-operatives 
prevailed. However, co-operatives did not, at any time, play an important role in the 
economic development of the country. 
The process of privatization began before independence in all three Baltic countries. 
The first private enterprises were established during the period of liberalization that 
followed Gorbatchev’s policy of ‘perestroika’. In this period, small state enterprises, 
new co-operatives, leased enterprises and joint ventures were introduced. The Soviet 
law on enterprises from 1987 granted the general meeting of employees’ rights 
concerning future production plans and the right to elect the enterprise’s director. 
Latvia was the first Soviet Republic that implemented this law. The government soon 
realized that the application of Soviet legislation lead to dissipation of state assets at 
rather less than fair value. As a result, they introduced legislation to stem the flow 
(OECD, 2000, pp. 121-123). All Latvian co-operatives had to restructure and re-
register before March 1992, and the activities open to co-operatives were restricted, 
forcing the dissolution of many of them. Latvians could continue to lease state 
companies, but the legal status remained unclear until February 1993 when new 
legislation made it possible for groups of employees to make a new leasing contract. 
The legislation also allowed companies to issue shares worth up to 10% of the 
authorized capital and to sell them to employees at a discount, or to transfer them free 
of charge, but value had to be paid in full when the employees left the company.  
These shares had full voting right.  
Except for some early experiments, small privatization started in November 1991 
according to the Law on Privatization of Objects of Trade, Catering and Services. 
These objects were transferred to municipalities which implemented small 
privatization. The initiative for privatization could come from the employees or other 
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potential buyers. The decision about privatization, method, initial price etc. was made 
by local privatization commissions consisting of representatives of the state, 
municipality, trade unions and specialists. Possible privatization methods were sale to 
employees, auctions to a selected group, open auctions and sale to a selected buyer. 
Especially the latter method made dubious dealings possible (Vojevoda and Rumpis, 
1993, p. 8).  Employees who had been working in the enterprise at least 5 years had a 
pre-emptive right to buy shares at the initial price. Purchasers had to be Latvian 
citizens or have been living in Latvia for at least 16 years, so that foreigners played no 
role in the first years of small privatization. The legislation was changed in February 
1992, whereby the pre-emptive right for employees was abolished. Some size 
restrictions were also removed and the number of branches included in municipal 
governed privatization was gradually extended.  
A list of medium and large enterprises to be privatized was passed with the decrees of 
August 1992 and of February 1993. The list consisted of 579 enterprises proposed by 
the sector ministries. 400 of these enterprises were to be privatized by public offerings 
of shares, but 147 were to be leased with the option to buy. Later this list was extended 
to 712 enterprises (Jemeljanovs, 1996, p. 205). However, except for the leasing option 
the privatization proceeded very slowly and before the privatization agency took over, 
only around 50 large- and medium-sized enterprises were privatized and 78 companies 
transformed into statutory companies as a preparatory step for privatization. 
In 1992-1994, the privatization process was decentralized whereby sector ministries 
became key privatization institutions, so that the existing networks could be used to 
the advantage of insiders. This was mainly done using the legislation on leasing with an 
option to buy. Former owners had the first right to make a leasing contract, the 
insiders of the company came in the second place. For that reason, especially managers 
had good opportunities to take their enterprises over (Shteinbuka, 1996, p. 187). In 
1994, the possibility of making new leasing contracts was removed by the new 
privatization law. In the period between 1992 and 1994 privatization was rather slow 
and only 234 firms were privatized using leasing. Of 234 leased enterprises 204 were 
bought out in most cases by the leaseholder, 16 leasing contracts were annulled (LPA, 
1998). The average price for leasing buy-outs was on the same level as for tender 
privatization. 
In 1994, the legislation was changed following the Treuhand model and the Latvian 
Privatization Agency (LPA) was established in May 1994. LPA organised the first inter-
national tender at the end of 1994. In 1995 and 1996 the process gained some speed to 
peak in 1997 with privatization of 313 enterprises. From 17 April 1994 till 1 October 
2004, privatization rules have been approved in the statutory procedure for 2,126 state 
property units (except land), and 1,989 units (93.5% of state property units to be priva-
tized) have been sold (purchase agreements signed with new owners), organised into 
statutory enterprises or liquidated. The tenders usually resulted in a purchase 
agreement with a single unit or a consortium most often acquiring a majority of shares. 
Most of these sales were to domestic outsiders, but some of the largest went to foreign 
owners; insiders played a minor role. 
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b) Social Partners  
The interests of employees in Latvia are represented by the trade unions. Trade unions 
started their activities in 1905 and at that time united 25,000 workers. The role of trade 
unions has been increasing until 1919 with support provided mainly by social 
democrats. The activities of trade unions peaked in 1933 when 40 organisations and 
units operated in different industries and different regions and the total number of 
unionised workers was 50,000. In the period from 1934 until 1940 trade unions were 
not active due to the political regime. After Latvia regained its independence in 1990, 
the Law on Trade Unions was adopted on 13 December 1990. The Free Trade Union 
Confederation of Latvia (FTUC) is the biggest non-governmental organisation in 
Latvia, which protects the interests of employees who are trade union members at the 
branch and inter-branch level and represents 25 organisations.2 Trade unions are quite 
weak and the current rate of unionisation in Latvia is 18% according to the calculation 
of the authors. On the one hand, it is due to discredit of trade unions in connection 
with their role under Soviet rule. On the other hand, present economic problems such 
as job uncertainty and high unemployment3 lead to inactivity4 of employees concerning 
their rights. The interests of employers are represented by Latvian Employer’s 
Confederation (LEC). With regard to financial participation of employees, Director 
General of the LEC, Ms. Elina Egle, declared in the interview that the Confederation’s 
activities are in line with the government legislation and that financial participation of 
employees is outside the area of competence of the Confederation.  
Recently, a dialogue between social partners has been promoted by the government. 
The LEC, FTUC and the government signed the Tripartite Agreement on Social and 
Economic Partnership on 1 October 2004 on the initiative of the Prime Minister Mr. 
Indulis Emsis. However, the issue of financial participation has not yet been addressed 
in this context. 
 
c) Current National Policy  
The government is not concerned with the financial participation of employees, since 
the reduction of employment is considered to have priority. The Ministry of Social 
Affairs concentrates its activities on solving problems related to increase of minimum 
wages and allowances for the unemployed.  
Participation of employees has not been on the political agenda of the Parliament. 
Political parties and other policy makers do not pay attention to the issue of 
employees’
                                                 
2  Latvijas Republikas Likums par arodbiedribam, Ziņotajs, No. 3/4, 31 January 1991 as amended. 
3  The unemployment rate was 10.6% in 2003.  
4  An important factor influencing the behaviour of employees is the psychological factor which is 
determined by the age, lack of experience in defending their rights in a market economy and lack 
of relevant education of many elder employees. The psychological factor leads to the lack of 
interest in obtaining additional rights and value by purchasing shares.  
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financial participation. Financial participation as a component of social model 
development was not included in economic parts of parties’ programmes. As individual 
interviews with policy makers have shown, there is no knowledge of the concept and 
no awareness of possible positive economic impact of financial participation and no 
dialogue between those representing interests of employees and employers about the 
idea of financial participation. 
 
 
2. Types of Schemes and their Legal Foundations 
 
Employee share ownership as well as profit-sharing are used in Latvian companies and 
are directly or indirectly regulated by legal acts affecting the effectiveness of such forms 
of financial participation. Whereas no special legal regulation on profit-sharing exists, 
there are several legal acts which touch upon employee share ownership and should be 
interpreted in correlation with each other. However, regulation of employee share 
ownership has not been developed systematically, so that it partly creates incentives 
and partly inhibits the development of such schemes. 
 
a) Employee Share Ownership and its Legal Foundations 
The main form of financial participation of employees in Latvia is employee share 
ownership. 
 
(1) Privatization Issues 
Although the privatization is advanced it is not completed yet, so that it is still possible 
for employees to acquire shares in special procedures as prescribed by law. The Law on 
Privatization of Objects Owned by the State or a Municipality, hereinafter referred to 
as PL, is the main regulatory act on privatization of enterprises. The PL was adopted 
on 17 February 1994 and, although amended, is still in force. It shall be interpreted in 
line with the Law on Reorganisation of State and Municipal Enterprises in Statute 
Corporations from 8 July 1996, hereinafter referred to as RL. 
The PL provides for various methods of privatization such as sale, investments in 
share capital, increasing of share capital by attracting private investors, sale of shares to 
the management of the company (Art. 2). Shares of state-owned corporates can be sold 
to the employees in the course of privatization even below the nominal value of such 
shares, however, the shares to be privatized to the employees cannot amount to more 
than 20% of the share capital of the particular company (Art. 57 RL). If municipal 
objects are privatized by restructuring, the plan of such privatization shall contain a 
clause stating how many shares will be sold to employees as well as the discount, if 
such is applicable according to law (Art. 40 (2.5) RL). Management buy-out can be 
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applied if the company has no tax debts, no salary debts to employees, no other debts 
or encumbrances amounting to more than 10% of the equity capital, and the 
company’s business activities comply with the articles of association (Art. 2 (6) PL). By 
using such a method of privatization, up to 25% of the shares can be sold to the 
management (Art. 2 (2.6) RL). 
As can be seen from the legal acts directly regulating the issue of privatization of state- 
owned shares of enterprises, an important difference exists between employee 
ownership and management ownership, the latter being even subject to a special 
privatization method, which can be used as a reward for successful managers of state- 
or municipality-owned corporations. However, the 20% limit of employees share 
privatization appears as a limitation of rights rather than a privilege, due to the fact that 
there is no clear obligation in the law to offer any shares to the employees at all in a 
particular privatization case. 
There are no special rules for participation of employees in decision-making 
concerning privatization matters. The general rules of the Commercial Law apply 
stating that the right to take part in the administration of the company, to receive 
dividends and, in the case of the liquidation of the company, to a liquidation quota are 
attached to the share (Art. 226 of the Commercial Law from 13 April 2000). However, 
it should be noted that the limit of 20% regarding employees’ shares and 2% regarding 
management shares in most cases cannot provide for a genuine influential participation 
in decision making, due to the fact that in most cases a two-third majority will be 
required for important resolutions, therefore, employees or managers can be outvoted 
even in very essential decisions (e.g. a change of statutes or increase of share capital). 
 
(2) Company and Securities Law 
General issues on commercial activities, i.e. activities by merchants, are regulated by 
the Commercial Law from 13 April 2000, hereinafter referred to as CL. According to 
CL, a merchant is a physical person (an individual merchant) or a business (partner-
ships and corporations) registered with the Commercial Register (Art. 134 (1) CL). 
 
(a) Corporations 
There are two forms of corporations with important differences in respect of the 
regulation of the share ownership of employees: limited liability company (hereinafter 
referred to as LLC), a private company, the shares of which are not publicly tradable 
objects, and joint-stock company (hereinafter referred to as JSC), a company the stocks 
of which can be publicly tradable objects (Art. 134 (3), (4) CL). For LLC, there are no 
special legal regulations on employee share ownership so that general rules apply. By 
contrast, JSC can issue special employee stock which can be acquired by employees in 
the broad sense, ie including managers (Art. 255 (1) CL). Employee stock shall be 
issued only on account of the net profit of the company, and the total value of 
employee stock should not exceed 10% of the registered equity capital of the company 
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(Art. 255 (4) CL). Another limitation concerning employee stock is the requirement 
that the сompany’s own capital should not become less than the registered capital (Art. 
255 (5) CL). No voting right and right to liquidation quota are attached to employee 
stock issued according to Art. 255 CL.5 Such stocks can be freely sold if the articles of 
association do not provide otherwise (Art. 255 (7) CL). It must, however, be noted that 
in the event that an employment contract is terminated, or a member of the board of 
directors leaves office, the company has a pre-emptive right to acquire employee stock 
(Art. 255 (8) CL). There is no provision in capital market regulations that issuing of 
employee stocks shall be considered to be a public offering. For the purposes of the 
respective rules, an offer shall not be a public offer, where it regards transferable 
securities offered as a bonus to the current or former employees or members of the 
executive board by the issuer or a capital company that together with the issuer 
belongs to the same concern (connected corporation) (Art. 14 (2), 11 of the Law on 
the Financial Market from 20 November 2003, hereinafter referred to as LFM). It is 
the only provision to be found on employee share ownership in the legislation on 
securities. 
There is special regulation concerning employee shares in state- or municipality-owned 
companies. According to the Law on State and Municipality Corporations the 
government of Latvia or the respective municipal authority decides in which state or 
municipal company employees’ shares can be issued (Art. 68 (1), (2)). Employee shares 
can belong only to employees and board members and cannot be alienated to other 
persons, even to other employees (Art. 68 (4), (5)). If the employment is terminated, or 
the member of the board leaves office, employee’s share is transferred back to the 
company (Art. 68 (6)). This is one of the exceptions when a company is allowed to 
acquire its own stock (Art. 70).  In the case the company has acquired its employee 
stock, it is to be transferred to the employees within six months from the moment. If 
the shares are not transferred within the mentioned time period, the shares will be 
deleted and the share capital will be decreased respectively (Art. 71 (1), (2)). 
The major share owner owning at least 95% of all shares can make a final share buyout 
offer and, in such case, the minority, which on some occasions may be employees of 
the company who acquired shares during the privatization, would have an obligation to 
sell the shares to the major shareholder (Art. 81 LFM). Therefore on some occasions 
employees holding minority shares can be forced to sell their shares to the majority 
shareholder.  
In order to facilitate the acquisition of stocks of the employees the legislator has 
provided the possibility that a company may fully pay up stock, which can belong only 
to the employees of the company (employee stock) (Art. 237 (1) CL). The case where 
the company acquires employee stock is the exemption from the general rule 
                                                 
5  Employee stock issued by a private JSC according to Art. 255 CL should be differentiated from 
the stock acquired by employees in the course of privatization. Limitations attached to employee 
stock according to Art. 255 CL, in particular lack of voting rights, do not apply to privatization 
stock. 
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prohibiting the company to acquire its own stock which can belong only to employees 
(Art. 240 (1), (3) CL) provided for that it is transferred within 6 months (Art. 242 CL). 
The equity capital of JSC can only be increased if the stock is to be utilised for special 
purposes, one of them being distribution of the newly issued stock among employees 
(Art. 254 (2), (6) CL). These provisions create incentives for the company to issue 
employee stock.  
As far as participation rights arising from share ownership are concerned, shares/stock 
acquired by employees in the course of privatization, shares of employees in LLC and 
employee stock issued according to Art. 255 CL by JSC should be distinguished. 
Whereas voting right is attached to the shares/stock acquired by employees in the 
course of privatization and shares of employees in LLC, employee stock issued 
according to Art. 255 CL by JSC is non-voting stock. Therefore, share ownership in 
general provides for a possibility of participating in decision-making, with the 
exception of employee stock. However, the influence would not be strong also in cases 
where employees possess voting shares, since employees would be minority 
shareholders in most cases.  
Further, the Labour Law from 1 June 2002 as amended contains provisions on 
establishing work councils in enterprises in accordance with the respective EC 
regulations. Employees can protect their rights through trade unions or by electing 
their representatives to the work council (Art. 10, 11 of the Labour Law). In 
enterprises with more than five employees, employees are entitled to appoint their 
representatives for representing the interests of the employees of the respective 
enterprise, where their interests can collide with those of an employer. Employees’ 
representatives are elected by at least half of employees by a majority vote.  
Like German regulations concerning the establishment of a similar institution, the 
Betriebsrat, the Latvian Labour Law contains provisions concerning such rights of 
employees as the right to vote and the right to be elected. Moreover, it is not required 
that the employees’ representative should be an employee in the respective enterprise. 
The law provides no legal instruments for the employer to restrict the right of em-
ployees to elect their representatives. Thus, the employer cannot legally prevent the 
elections and determine or impose the candidates for the position of a representative. 
The Labour Law grants the representatives the right to demand information about 
economic and social conditions as well as about decisions that could influence the 
interests of employees.  
The Labour Law provides a legal tool for influencing the activities of the 
representatives only after they have been chosen. Performance of the duties of an em-
ployee representative may not serve as a basis for refusal to enter into an employment 
contract, for termination of an employment contract, or for otherwise restricting the 
rights of an employee. However, the employer is entitled to require that the rights of 
the employees’ representatives shall be exercised so that the efficiency of the 
operations of the undertaking is not reduced (Art. 11 (2) of the Labour Law). Em-
ployee representatives have also the duty not to disclose information brought to their 
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attention that is a commercial secret of the employer. The employer has the duty to 
indicate in writing what information is to be regarded as a commercial secret. 
Since 7 April 2005 special provisions on work councils in European Companies, herei-
nafter referred to as SE, contained in the Latvian law on European Company, hereinaf-
ter referred to as LEC, are in force. The law applies if the SE is registered in Latvia, 
company registered in Latvia participates in the foundation of the SE or founding 
company of the SE registered in another EU state registers an affiliated company in 
Latvia. Where the management or administrative organs of the participating companies 
draw up a plan for the establishment of a SE, they shall negotiate with the 
representatives of the companies’ employees on arrangements for the involvement of 
employees in the SE (Art. 16 (1) LEC). The employees of companies participating in 
the establishing of a SE may elect already appointed employees’ representative to nego-
tiate the involvement of employees in the SE (Art. 19 (1) LEC). A special negotiating 
group should be elected if the amount of employees in the company participating in 
the establishment of a SE is not sufficient in order to elect employees representatives 
(Art. 19 (2) LEC). The level of involvement of employees in the SE depends on the 
level of their involvement in the companies establishing the SE. The SE must inform 
and consult the representatives of employees of the SE about the development of the 
business and of production and sales, the situation and probable trend of employment, 
investments, and substantial changes concerning organization, introduction of new 
working methods or production processes, transfers of production, mergers, cut-backs 
or closures of undertakings, establishments or important parts thereof, and collective 
layoffs. In the case a SE is established by transformation and the rules of a Member 
State relating to employees’ participation in the administrative or supervisory body 
applied before registration of a SE, all aspects of employees’ participation shall 
continue to apply to the SE. If none of the participating companies was governed by 
participation rules before registration of the SE, the latter shall not be required to 
establish provisions for employees’ participation (Art. 33 LEC). Thus, if the Latvian 
JSC participated in the establishing of a SE together with the JSC registered in another 
EU Member State, which provides no rules on participation of the employees, these 
rules should not be implemented.   
 
(b) Co-operatives 
The number of co-operatives is relatively small, but it is a persistent business form 
which is still used, especially in agriculture. Co-operatives are outside the scope of 
application of the Commercial Law and are regulated by the Law on Co-operatives 
from 5 February 1998 (hereinafter referred to as CoopL) with later amendments. The 
law defines a co-operative as a voluntary association of physical persons or legal 
entities created with the purpose to provide services to increase the efficiency of the 
economical activities of its members (Art. 1 (5), 3 (1), 17 CoopL). The members are 
not responsible for liabilities of the co-operative. Unlike the right to vote in 
corporations, the right to vote in co-operatives depends not upon the amount of the 
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contribution invested; each member is entitled to one vote only (Art. 22 (2) CoopL). A 
co-operative is a legal entity and each member of a co-operative is entitled to 
participation in the management, to dividends of profits, which will be divided 
according to the investment of the respective member and according to the statutes of 
the co-operative (Art. 1, 3, 34 CoopL). 
All co-operatives can be divided into commercial and non-commercial co-operatives. 
The purpose of forming commercial co-operatives is profit-making, whereas non-
commercial co-operatives are aimed at improving the management of property 
belonging to co-operative members. The organs of the co-operative are the Members’ 
meeting, the Board and the Supervisory Council (Art. 37 CoopL). The members’ 
meeting is entitled to elect and revoke the Board, the Supervisory Council, the Auditor 
and the Liquidation Commission, to determine the remuneration of the board 
members and to make decisions on important issues (Art. 39 CoopL). Other decisions 
are made by the board. The member of the board are jointly and severally liable for 
board decisions and have the burden of proof for the actions of the board. The 
Supervisory Council can be elected to control the board between the meetings.  
There are no limitations on distribution of profit of the co-operatives. However, the 
Law on Co-operatives provides for an order of distribution of profit. Firstly, profit is 
distributed to make reserve capital in accordance with the articles of association, se-
condly, to pay out dividends and, thirdly, to repay profit. The remaining part of profit 
can be distributed in accordance with the decision of the members’ meeting. 
There are special rules on agricultural co-operatives (Regulation of the Cabinet of 
Ministers No. 328). Agricultural co-operatives do not produce agricultural products, 
but provide services for farmers. Agricultural co-operatives have to be registered in the 
company register and be recognised by the committee consisting of representatives of 
the State Revenue Service, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Rural Support Service and 
the Latvian Association of the Agricultural co-operatives.  
Liability of members of co-operatives is limited and profit can be distributed, but there 
are limitations on distribution of profit, so that LLC would be a more convenient busi-
ness form. Each member of a co-operative has one vote, but this advantageous rule is 
relevant for employees only in workers co-operatives that are not numerous in Latvia. 
 
(c) Partnerships 
Partnerships usually are established in order to implement specific projects, e.g. 
construction companies, establish a partnership to join their resources and means for a 
big construction project. However, this business form is not used by small human 
capital intensive firms like law firms which prefer LLC due to limitation of liability. 
This means that partnerships are not relevant for financial participation of employees 
presently. Partnerships in Latvia are divided in general partnerships (pilnsabiedrība) 
and limited partnerships (komandītsabiedrība) under the Commercial law. However, 
only general partnerships might become relevant for employee participation, and they 
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should be presented below. The Civil Law provisions regarding partnership contracts 
shall be applied to a general partnership, in so far as the Commercial law does not 
provide otherwise. Partnerships are not deemed legal entities under Latvian law. They 
are not to be registered, unless they are achieved for a specific project. A general 
partnership is a company in which two or more partners operate under a common 
business name. A physical person or legal entity can be partner in a general 
partnership. All partners are jointly and personally liable for the obligations of the 
general partnership with all of their assets and personal property. Agreements that 
contradict this rule are void in relation to third parties (Art. 94 CL). A general 
partnership operates on the basis of a partnership contract concluded by the partners, 
which may be amended only with the consent of all partners. Each partner can 
represent the general partnership in all legal transactions unless the partnership 
contract prescribes otherwise.  
On the one hand, the establishment of a partnership is easier and cheaper than of the 
LLC. The founders have to conclude a partnership contract. The law does not require 
a written form of this contract. It can be an oral agreement and it should generally not 
be submitted it to the Commercial Register. For partnerships the law does not require 
a minimal statute capital, establishment of management bodies and preparation of the 
articles of association. Relations between partners are regulated only by a partnership 
contract. If a partnership contract does not contain any provisions on this issue the 
commercial law and civil law regulate the relations between partners. On the other 
hand, the law provides for joint liability of partners. A specific form of partnership 
where it is possible that only one partner is liable if the damage which is caused by him 
personally as in German law firms does not exist in Latvia. 
In partnerships, the consent of all partners shall be necessary to take a decision. How-
ever, a partnership contract can provide that a decision shall be taken by majority vote.  
 
b) Profit-Sharing 
There are no limitations in the law with regard to profit-sharing of companies with 
their employees; however, there are also no exact regulations with regard to such 
profit-sharing. It is possible to determine the amount of salary to be dependent on the 
profit of the company and it is possible to provide benefits in the form of premiums as 
well as other benefits directly connected with the profit of a particular company. 
However, all those benefits will be subject to personal income tax amounting to 25%. 
In such a way the incentive to provide additional benefits is decreased since the 
benefits of profit-sharing are 25% less than they would be in the case of share 
ownership by paying out dividends to the shareholders, because dividend payments on 
the contrary are not taxed.  
In addition, there is a tendency to use other alternatives to paying salaries to the 
employees, not by offering shareholdings in the company but rather to register 
employees as self-employed persons and to conclude service contracts with these 
persons. 
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c) Taxation Issues 
The most important regulatory acts on taxation are the Law on Personal Income Tax 
from 11 May 1993 as amended (hereinafter referred to as LPT) and Law on Corporate 
Income Tax from 9 February 1995 as amended (hereinafter referred to as LCT). Since 
there are no taxes on dividends distributed when establishing a new company there is a 
strong incentive to get the profit out of the company not by way of salary to an 
employee, but rather by paying out dividends and finding other ways to get to the 
profit which is primarily connected with the differences in the taxation: general 
personal income tax 25% flat (Art. 15, 2 LPT); corporate income tax 15% flat (Art. 3 
(1) LCT); exception from general personal income tax: there is no tax on dividends 
either for companies nor for physical persons who receive the dividends (Art. 9, 2 
LPT).   
Tax legislation does not expressly regulate compensatory forms of profit-sharing. The 
Law on Taxes and Duties states that personal and corporate income taxes compose a 
uniform income tax system (Art. 4 (1)) and that the same income cannot be subject to 
both income taxes - corporate and personal - unless explicitly required by law (Art. 4 
(4)). Furthermore, the Law on Personal Income Tax states that income tax can be 
imposed only as a tax on income from economic activity where it is not subject to the 
corporate income tax, and tax on other sources of income (Art. 1 (3) LPT). Thus, it is 
indicated that the net income after taxes is subject to the procedure of utilization of 
company profit according to Art. 189 CL. 
 
 
3. Incidence Now and Over Time 
 
Financial participation of employees, especially employee share ownership, emerged in 
the course of privatization, but was not sufficiently supported after 1994 and was 
steadily decreasing over time.  
 
a) Small Privatization 
In 1992, only in 8% of all cases an auction was the chosen method of small 
privatization because the municipal authorities were against favoring the richest 
purchasers, and auctions usually resulted in prices much higher than the initial price. 
The auction price was on average 5 times higher than the initial price while the average 
final price was 3.7 times higher than the initial price (Vojevoda and Rumpis, 1993, p. 
10). Direct sale to employees or to another selected buyer was by far the most frequent 
method and more than the half of enterprises in small privatization were sold by 
instalments (see Table 1).  
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Table 1. Small privatization in Latvia (trade, catering and service) 
1000 LVL (current p.) 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 total 
Enterprises 302 423 231 68 45 45 48 1162 
of which sold at 
auctions 
24 
8% 
 
 
88* 
9%* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
10% 
122 
11% 
Iinitial price 361 1971 3521 1174 2242 1258 865 11392 
Final price 1350 3871 4044 1188 2245 1263 874 14835 
Final/initial price 3.74 1.97 1.15 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.30 
Average final price 4.47 9.15 17.50 17.47 49.89 28.07 18.21 12.77 
% paid by vouchers 0% 0% 2% 5% 19% 46% 58% 11% 
Based on Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia. *1992-94.  (Mygind 2000, p. 53) 
The high price difference between auctions and direct sale indicates that there were 
favourable conditions for insiders buying at the initial price. These advantages for 
insiders prevailed in practice for some time even after the legislation had been changed 
in February 1992. The local privatization commissions continued to give preferences to 
insiders (Frydman et al., 1993, p. 223). We do not have exact data on what percentage 
of enterprises was taken over by insiders, but we estimate that especially in the first 
years this was the case for the majority of small enterprises. Most small enterprises had 
been privatized by 1994, so although the proportion of payment by vouchers were high 
in the latest years, vouchers were not important for small privatization.  
 
b) Large Privatization 
Large privatization of state-owned property and land is being carried out by the 
Latvian Privatization Agency (LPA) organised as a JSC under the Law on Privatization 
of Property Units Owned by the State and Municipalities from 17 February 1994. The 
main privatization method under this law was sale by tender to the highest bidder 
supplemented by restitution and mass privatization. Many of the largest enterprises 
have combined sale of a dominating block of shares to a core investor, and sale of 
minority share holdings in public offerings. 
For mass privatization, a voucher scheme was used. In November 1992, the Law on 
Privatization Certificates (Vouchers) was passed after long political debates, but the 
distribution of vouchers did not start before September 1993, and the majority of 
persons entitled to vouchers started to invest them only in the summer of 1994. The 
people obtained one voucher for each year of living in Latvia after the World War II. 
Pre-war citizens and their descendants got additional 15 vouchers while 5 vouchers 
were deducted from people who settled in Latvia after the World War II. Only very 
few investment funds were formed. 9 licenses were given to investment funds based 
on vouchers, but only 5 were functioning. In 1995-98 vouchers for a nominal value of 
only around 9 million LVL were put into investment funds making up less than 1% of 
the distributed vouchers (Mygind, 2000, p. 17).  
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By 1 October 2004, a total of 103.9 million privatization vouchers have been issued to 
2.45 million persons for the time they have lived in Latvia, including 788.3 thousand 
vouchers granted to 40.8 thousand politically repressed persons. A total of 7.73 million 
property compensation vouchers have been issued to 112.3 thousand former owners 
or their heirs, including 764.9 thousand vouchers for urban land, 458.5 thousand 
vouchers for companies and other property units, 89.9 thousand vouchers for property 
taken away from the politically repressed persons and 75.1 thousand vouchers for 
property alienated in illegal manner. In the first three quarters of 2004, a total of 116.7 
thousand property compensation vouchers have been granted to 1.9 thousand former 
owners or their heirs. Compensations totalling 17.4 million LVL have been paid to 
8,391 persons. By 1 October 2004, cash compensations amounting to 4.3 million LVL 
were paid to 24.6 thousand politically repressed persons as payment for privatization 
vouchers.6 100.63 million vouchers or 90.2% of the total number of issued vouchers 
have been used for privatization of state and local government property units by 1 
October 2004 (see Table 2). As of 1 October 2004, a total of 4.12 million vouchers or 
3.7% of the total number of the vouchers issued, including 0.46 million property 
compensation vouchers, were on accounts of 500 thousand physical persons. On the 
accounts of legal entities, there were 4.68 million privatization vouchers, including 0.33 
million property compensation vouchers. Holders of privatization vouchers in October 
2004 could use services of 23 licensed intermediary companies to make transactions on 
the privatization voucher market. Vouchers could be used until 1 July 2005. 
Table 2. Use of privatization vouchers (as of October 1, 2004)    
Type of Property Number 
Number of 
vouchers    
(million) 
incl. property compen-
sation vouchers    
(thousand) 
For purchase of housing 412 thousand of 
privatized housing units
34.57 582.1 
For purchase of an 
enterprise and other 
properties 
Accurate data not 
available 
7.07 109.6 
For  purchase of shares  accurate data not available 44.42 954.0 
Total:  100.63 6,250.0 
% of total vouchers 
issued 
 90.2% 80.8% 
Report on the Economic Development of Latvia, 2004, p. 130. 
On average 60% of the price was financed by vouchers. The market value of vouchers 
was only around 10-20% of the nominal value. The total sales price for state property 
units (except land) sold for lats and privatization vouchers were 1,644 billion LVL, 
including 1,347 billion LVL in privatization vouchers.  
                                                 
6  See Report on the Economic Development of Latvia, Riga, December 2004, pp. 127-128. 
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Insider take-overs lost their importance after 1994. However, mainly in the companies 
with shares sold in public offerings the employees had the right to buy up to 20% of 
the shares. By the end of 1998, shares with the nominal value of 27 million LVL had 
been sold for vouchers to 25,611 employees and former employees of the companies 
comprising 13.56% of the shares (LPA 1998). Shares for 4.4 million LVL were sold for 
vouchers to 250 managers of 24 companies, making up 13.6% of the shares. (LPA 
1998). 
 
c) Case Studies and Survey Evidence 
Case studies on 9 Latvian companies (see Table 3) described over the whole transition 
period from before their privatization confirm the results of the quantitative studies, 
while at the same time they give some important details of the development in 
employees’ financial participation over the period (Mygind, 2002b). 7 of these 
companies were privatized quite early in the process. Dzintars, known as a supplier of 
cosmetics to the whole Soviet Union, was an early experiment of a large privatization 
to the employees. Another company, Jaude, producing electrical equipment, started as a 
new co-operative, but was later like the remaining early privatization cases, 
transformed to insider ownership through leasing with the option to buy. When the 
shares were relatively cheap for the employees the result was a quite broad and equal 
takeover by the employees (Dzintars, Pionieris and Ausma while in other cases we saw a 
higher concentration of ownership on managers and specialists combined with quite 
many non-owners among the employees.  
Table 3. Determinants of ownership structure at the time of privatization 
         Product Initial 
ownership 
Privatization 
method 
Economic     
results 
Size Capital/ 
labour 
Dzintars perfume employee leasing wotb cream 900 low 
Jauda el.articles employee coop/ l. wotb cream 422 low 
Pionieris footwear employee leasing wotb defensive 500 low 
Ausma plastic employee leasing wotb defensive 800 low 
Arno clothes empl./man. leasing wotb defensive 350 low 
Juglas fabrics man./empl. leasing wotb defensive 400 low 
Mebelu furniture man/out/em leasing wotb defensive 514 low 
Lode        late bricks coreoutside LPA-tender cream 268 high 
Valmiera late fiberglass core foreign LPA-tender cream 1,340 high 
wotb = with the option to buy      ( Mygind, 2002a) 
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When shares were cheap per employee we find often quite broad and equal employee 
ownership like in Dzintars, Pionieris, Ausma and for minority shares also Lode and 
Valmiera. 
In other cases we find higher ownership concentration around managers, specialists 
and at the same time quite many non-owners among the employees. In employee 
surveys we found that the main motives for buying shares were: good offer, 
employment (especially for workers), control (especially for managers and specialists). 
The development in ownership structure as a result of privatization and the following 
changes can be analysed based on general enterprise data from the statistical 
department and a specific ownership survey done in 1997 of 167 companies covering 
1993-1996 (Mygind 2002b) and another survey done in 2000 of 915 companies 
covering ownership ultimo 1997 and 1999 (Jones and Mygind 2005).  
By January 1995, small enterprises with fewer than 100 employees owned by the state 
have mainly been taken over or are started by insiders and more than 50% of 
companies with fewer than 100 employees were majority-insider-owned. More than 
two thirds of enterprises with 1-4 employees were majority-insider-owned. For 
enterprises with more than 500 employees the corresponding figure was only 18%. 
Most of the enterprises with majority insider ownership in 1995 were 100% owned by 
insiders. It is striking that for enterprises with 20-199 employees there are slightly more 
management-owned enterprises than employee-owned. However, for large enterprises 
with more than 200 employees we have no enterprises with management dominance in 
our small sample of 167 enterprises.  
We have data also for another large sample from 1997 (see Mygind, 2000). Insider 
ownership was highest in agriculture and fishing and lowest in transport and services. 
From the small sample it can be seen that the bulk of insider-owned enterprises in 
agriculture and fishing were broadly owned by employees, in manufacturing there is 
about balance, while managers were dominating in sectors such as construction, trade 
and transport. Enterprises with insider majority have around ten times lower capital 
intensity than other enterprises. The lowest percentage of non-owning employees is 
found in enterprises with employee majority ownership (see Table 4). Finally, the last 
columns show that there are more employee owners in privatized enterprises than in 
start-ups. 
Looking at the distribution among the employee owners it is striking that the 
employee-owned enterprises are mainly found in the middle category while it has the 
lowest frequency for both the categories of ‘rather equal’ and ‘very unequal’ 
distribution. The explanation might be that in employee-owned enterprises there are 
more owners and more shares owned by employees opening up for a wide spectrum 
and thus higher in-equality in the distribution of shares. Employee ownership includes 
a broad group of employees owning quite small shareholdings.    
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Table 4. Distribution of ownership on employees  
                  \ ownership 
average per enterprise 
state 
majority  
foreign 
majority 
domestic 
majority
manager 
majority
employee 
majority
no 
majority total 
priva-
tized new 
% nonowning 
employees       
 
 
  
 
1993 
   N 
82 
(7) 
70 
(4) 
52 
(23) 
85 
(15) 
41 
(27) 
62 
(6) 
58 
(82) 
45 
(42) 
70 
(33) 
 
 
 
1994 
   N 
80 
(7) 
78 
(5) 
46 
(27) 
89 
(17) 
43 
(25) 
64 
(8) 
60 
(89) 
48 
(48) 
71 
(34) 
 
 
1995 
   N 
76 
(8) 
79 
(5) 
47 
(27) 
84 
(18) 
41 
(26) 
67 
(9) 
59 
(93) 
46 
(50) 
72 
(35) 
 
 
response-rate 
1996 
   N 
   pct 
87 
(6) 
30 
79 
(4) 
31 
51 
(26) 
74 
80 
(24) 
48 
46 
(26) 
81 
63 
(10) 
71 
61 
(96) 
59 
50 
(54) 
74 
75 
(36) 
51 
distribution of shares on  employee owners ultimo 1996 
rather equal 
 
 
(Pct) 
1 
(100) 
4 
(57) 
13 
(46) 
25 
(59) 
11 
(36) 
6 
(46) 
60 
(50) 
23 
(37) 
36 
(62) 
unequal (more than 1:2) 
(Pct) 
 0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
8 
(29) 
5 
(12) 
14 
(47) 
4 
(31) 
31 
(25) 
23 
(37) 
8 
(14) 
very unequal (> 1:10) 
(Pct) 
0 
(0) 
3 
(43) 
7 
(25) 
12 
(29) 
5 
(17) 
3 
(23) 
30 
(25) 
16 
(26) 
14 
(24) 
 
N 
(Pct) 
1 
(100) 
7 
(100) 
28 
(100) 
42 
(100) 
30 
(100) 
13 
(100) 
121 
(100)
62 
(100) 
58 
(100)
(Mygind, 2002a) 
In the small sample of 167 enterprises we can distinguish between newly started and 
privatized enterprises. The proportion of newly started enterprises is highest among 
the small enterprises. The division of new and privatized on different ownership 
groups can be seen from Table 4. Although the sample is quite small the following 
strong tendencies can be assumed to have general validity. Enterprises with broad 
employee ownership are mostly established in the privatization process. Newly started 
companies with high financial participation of employees can be expected to be found 
in industries with high input of human capital because motivation, recruitment and 
retention of knowledge workers are often decisive for the success of the companies 
(Mygind, 2001b, p. 324).  
In Jones and Mygind (2005) the dynamics of ownership for Latvia is based on 
responses from 915 enterprises specifying their ownership structure for 1997, 1998 and 
1999. For 730 of these enterprises the statistical departments’ own surveys include also 
ownership information for 1995 and 1996, however, without the distinction for 
insiders between employee and manager ownership. Table 7 shows the transition 
matrices for the period 1995-1999 for which we unfortunately cannot distinguish 
between manager and employee-ownership in 1995 and Table 8 covers the period 
1997-1999 where we can make the distinction. Table 7 shows that insider ownership is 
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by far the least stable. The most frequent change was from insider to former employee 
(38 cases). If we include these cases as employee-owned from the start we end up with 
a high change away from employee ownership. Except for 13 cases coming from 
ownership by former employees we see very few cases in the direction of employee 
ownership. Quite many insider enterprises are moving to domestic external ownership. 
In the period between 1997 and 1999 (see Table 8), manager ownership is surprisingly 
stable, whereas both employee and former employee ownership are changing. The 
most frequent changes were from employee to manager and from former employee to 
external domestic. These changes are accompanied by steep increase in concentration 
on the largest single owner.  
Table 7. Ownership transition matrix private firms 1995-1999 
      \ last year 
first year 
foreign domesti
c
manager employee  former 
 employee 
total change
foreign 105 7 6 0 0 118 11,0%
domestic 11 139 20 4 1 175 20,6%
manager 1 9 308 2 1 321 4,0%
employee 1 4 13 118 6 142 16,9%
former empl 0 10 1 13 39 63 38,1%
insider 6 32 12 8 38 96 79,2%
 124 201 360 145 85 915
Inside ownership 1995 followed by manager (employee) ownership in 1997 is recorded as manager 
(employee) ownership 1995 and 1997. Firms going from insider to manager in the table had another 
owner type in the meantime. Former employee is domestic ownership with concentration < 20%. 
(Jones and Mygind, 2005) 
Table 8. Latvia 1997-1999 Ownership transition matrix private firms             
           \1999 
1997 
foreign domest
ic
manager employee   former 
 employee  
total change
foreign 110 8 5 0 0 123 10,6%
domestic 8 161 13 4 2 188 14,4%
manager 2 12 326 2 0 342 4,7%
employee 2 6 15 135 9 167 19,2%
former empl 0 16 0 6 73 95 23,2%
 122 203 359 147 84 915
(Jones and Mygind, 2005) 
According to Latvian case studies, only in Dzintars there was some kind of regulation 
of the value of employees’ shares in relation to the internal value of the company. In 
the other six companies, the nominal value of shares was usually the trading price. 
Therefore, the employee owners could see their share-values being eaten up by very 
high inflation in the early years of transition. No dividends were paid, so employees 
had no feeling of the real value and possible capital gains from their shareholdings. In 
this situation the managers could buy the shares at relatively low prices from other 
employees who were in a very tight economic situation especially in the early years of 
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transition with falling real wages. In some cases, managers diluted the shares of 
employees by increasing the nominal share capital with themselves as the main 
receivers of the extra capital. As shown in Table 9, some of the companies have 
continued the governance cycle to the next stage of outside, often foreign, takeovers. 
Thus, the cases confirm the typical ownership cycle from employee over management 
to outside domestic or foreign ownership (Mygind, 2002b). Three of the nine 
companies were liquidated (see Table 9). 
Table 9. Takeover and concentration processes 
  Managers increase share  Outsiders increase share Exit 
Dzintars Management increase share from 1% 
to 5%, buy from employees 
Foreign: gradual purchase from 
employees and from state (priv)  
  
Jauda Managers and specialists purchase 
from other employees 
Not relevant   
Pionieris Not before liquidation Not successful in attracting foreign 
capital 
Liq. 
Ausma Managers increase share purchase 
from employees, new capital 
Not successful in attracting foreign 
capital 
Liq. 
Arno Managers increase share purchase 
from employees, new capital 
Not relevant   
Juglas Managers increase share by purchase 
from employees 
Foreign participation in alliance with 
management 
  
Mebelu Not before liquidation foreign takeover after liquidation/ 
reprivatization 
Liq. 
Lode and 
Valmiera 
Not relevant purchase on exchange and capital 
increase 
  
(Mygind, 2002a) 
 
d) Co-operatives 
The co-operative principle regarding the distribution of profits was not followed.  
Profit is distributed to the members according to the contribution to the capital (Art. 
34 (1) CoopL).  
Co-operatives are still more active in agriculture, but there are also small- and medium-
sized enterprises producing different products or providing services. Mr Ivars 
Strautins, president of the Central Co-operative Union Turiba declared that the co-
operative movement in Latvia is not strong and unites presently about 8,000 people 
and the number of co-operatives is about 140 in 2002-2004, with the exception of 
workers co-operatives. Most of them operate in agriculture. There are very few 
workers’ co-operatives. 
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e) Profit-Sharing 
The management survey of 167 companies from 1997 gives some information about 
the spread of profit-sharing in Latvia (see Table 10).     
  
Table 10. Form of payment for employees - on ownership - 1996  
 \majority ownership 
 
state foreign dom. mana-
ger 
employee no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new 
profit-sharing 
N 
   2 
(11) 
 18 
   0 
  (0) 
 11 
   1 
  (3) 
 30 
   0 
  (0) 
 49 
   5 
 (18)  
  28 
   2 
 (16) 
 12 
  10 
  (7) 
 149 
   5 
  (8) 
 66 
   3 
  (4) 
 65 
monetary incentive 
scheme 
N 
   8 
(44) 
 18 
   2 
(20) 
 10 
   9 
(29) 
 31 
   5 
(12) 
 43 
   2 
  (8) 
 26 
   2 
 (14) 
 14 
   29 
 (20) 
 143 
   9 
 (14) 
 63 
 12 
(19) 
 62 
(Mygind, 2002a) 
Profit-sharing is only reported in 7% of the responding enterprises, however, with 
18%, 5 out of 28 of the enterprises with majority employee ownership. Monetary 
incentive schemes are used in 20% of the enterprises, however, the percentage is falling 
over time from 28% in 1993 to 20% in 1996 (Mygind, 2002a, p. 17).  
Profit-sharing is likely to be used in new, human capital intensive sectors, e.g. IT, 
consulting and real estate companies. Currently, IT is one of the most dynamic 
industries in the Latvian economy. The government is promoting growth of the IT 
sector and announced that it is one of the priorities in the economic development 
programme. According to the 2004 data of the Central Statistical Bureau, 6,079 IT 
companies had a turnover of 207,597,530 LVL and profit of 10,519,947 LVL which 
means that IT is one of the most competitive and profitable sectors. There is a large 
number of NGOs in this industry. They influence implementation of modern 
technologies to develop IT industry as well as improvements in legislation and 
regulations regarding the positionf employees, but they do not promote financial 
participation as yet.7 Despite the fact that employees’ participation is presently low, 
there are factors that may influence the development of financial participation of 
employees in this sector in the near future. Most employees are young and highly 
qualified, have knowledge of economic issues and are not necessarily bound to one 
company, so that employers have to create incentives, e.g. by introducing employee 
ownership or profit-sharing, to keep them and, considering the high profits, employers 
are in the position to do so. Real estate sector is also generating high profits. It is 
typical of real estate companies to let realtors participate in the profit from the price of 
objects sold by them. In Latvia, realtors receive 3-5% of the profit. However, such 
participation can be considered as a means of motivation, but not as typical profit-
sharing, since it usually means that basic salary of realtors is very low.  
                                                 
7  See Report on the Economic Development of Latvia, December 2004, p. 110. 
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Real estate sector is also generating high profits. It is typical of real estate companies to 
let realtors participate in the profit from the price of objects sold by them. In Latvia, 
realtors receive 3-5% of the profit. However, such participation can be considered as a 
means of motivation, but not as typical profit-sharing, since it usually means that basic 
salary of realtors is very low. 
In several companies with foreign capital, some elements of the ESOP model as well 
as profit-sharing and stock options for employees are used.  
 
 
4. Empirical Evidence of Economic and Social Effects 
 
Production function analysis based on cross sections from 1994 and 1995 does not 
show any significant differences in factor productivity between ownership groups (see 
Jones and Mygind, 2000). A multi-variate analysis of the capital structure for the 1995 
data shows that the debt ratio for insider-owned enterprises is significantly higher than 
for state-owned enterprises. Bank loans are, however, significantly lower the more 
insiders own, and bank loans per employee are relatively low for insider-owned 
enterprises (Mygind, 2000, p. 36). Concerning the source of financing for different 
owner groups the traditional finding is confirmed for employee- owned companies in 
relation to their dependence on internally generated capital. Extra capital injected from 
external owners play an important role only for foreign, managerial and no majority 
enterprises.    
In the survey on 167 enterprises (see Mygind, 2002a) managers were asked about 
implementation of different forms of restructuring. It turned out that the differences 
between owner groups were modest concerning organisational changes of the number 
of departments and changes in hierarchical levels. Concerning orientation toward 
Western markets there was an increasing trend for all enterprises over the period of 
investigation 1993-96, with foreign-owned companies in a leading position.  
The in-depth case studies of 9 enterprises show the connection with initial conditions. 
Both Dzintars and Jauda were quite promising enterprises from the start, while the 
remaining five early privatized enterprises can be categorized as defensive takeovers by 
employees, as an alternative to complete close down of the companies. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that these five defensive companies have gone through serious crisis and 
three of them were finally closed down. All seven early privatizations had quite low 
capital intensity, while the two large companies privatized through the Latvian 
Privatization Agency, Lode and Valmiera, had high capital per employee. 
The relation between ownership and restructuring for the nine case companies is 
summarized in Table 11. We distinguish reactive restructuring where the companies 
adjust production and employment to the downward trend of demand especially in the 
early years, and strategic restructuring, where the companies develop new products, 
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markets, production methods etc. to adjust to the new opportunities on the market. In 
contrast to most theories, performance of most employee-owned case companies does 
not point in the direction of employee ownership as a barrier for adjustment of the 
labor-force - reactive restructuring. The exception is the furniture producer, Mebelu, 
where the reaction to falling demand was not cutting the labor-force, but cutting wages 
and labor hours. Also in the case of Juglas in the textile industry, low labor utilization 
point to some barriers for defensive restructuring. The barriers for strategic 
restructuring seem to be more important for the employee-owned enterprises. In three 
cases, Pionieris, Ausma and Arno, the general crisis of the industry meant low profits, no 
internal capital for investment, and in combination with no supply of external capital 
there was no room for strategic restructuring. However, it is worth noting that later 
shifts away from employee ownership did not improve the situation. Dzintars and Jauda 
are examples of strategic restructuring also in the period of employee ownership, 
although Dzintars strengthened restructuring in parallel with increased foreign 
involvement in ownership over time. This was also the case after the final takeover of 
Mebelu by foreign owners. 
Table 11. Ownership, governance and restructuring 
  Reactive restructuring 
adjust employment to demand 
Strategic restructuring 
Invest in new products and processes 
Dzintars ++ EO no barrier  ++ EO ok, but restructuring stronger in 
parallel with foreign involvement 
Jauda ++ EOMC no barrier  ++ EOMC ok 
Pionieris + EOMC no barrier - General crisis in industry 
Ausma + EOMC no barrier - No change when EO ? MO 
Arno + EOMC no barrier - No change when EO ? MO 
Juglas (+) Quite low labor-utilization ++ No causality with change in owners 
Mebelu - labor stable, low wage and hours -?+  + after foreign takeover 
Lode + even under state ownership ++ Strong coreowner, + bank 
Valmiera + even under state ownership ++ Start under state ownership 
developed more with foreign owner 
EO=employee ownership,  MC=management control, MO= management ownership 
++ high restructuring, + some restructuring, - no restructuring (Mygind, 2002a) 
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5. Conclusions  
 
The current level of development of financial participation of employees is low. There 
has been no sufficient support by the government and social partners for the last ten 
years. However, some regulations supporting employee share ownership still exist. A 
small number of companies use profit-sharing as a means of motivation on the basis of 
internal rules. The number of co-operatives is small and decreasing whereas the 
number of self-employed is large and increasing due to advantageous taxation.    
Employee majority enterprises have factor productivity equal to companies with other 
ownership forms, but lower capitalisation. Surprisingly, employee ownership does not 
present an obstacle for lay-offs as an element of reactive restructuring. 
Employee share ownership emerged in the course of privatization. In the early years of 
privatization, small state enterprises, new co-operatives and leased enterprises were in-
troduced. Leasing of enterprises with the option to buy was used until the mid-90ies, 
and it was one of the major methods of takeovers by insiders. During the small privati-
zation, more than 50% of small enterprises have been privatized by insiders, partly 
bought at a price under the actual value. In the large privatization, up to 20% of shares 
can be sold to employees, under certain conditions also at a discount. This regulation is 
still effective. However, there is no obligation to offer any shares to employees. Em-
ployees could and still can use vouchers distributed among all long-time residents of 
Latvia to pay for publicly offered shares of their enterprise if it is to be privatized. 
Despite these supportive measures, employee share ownership usually changed to 
former employee or to managment and finally to outsider domestic or foreign 
ownership after a quite short period of time as both surveys and case studies show.  
Only few regulations on employees’ financial participation schemes exist. Joint-stock 
companies can issue special employee stock without voting right corresponding to up 
to 10% of the equity capital in the course of capital increase. For employee stock of 
state and municipal companies, there is an additional provision that employees can not 
alienate such stock and lose it to the company when leaving, but the company is also 
obliged to transfer these shares to other employees and can not use them for other 
purposes. Since there are no taxes on dividends distributed when establishing a new 
company there is a strong incentive to get the profit out of the company not by way of 
salary to an employee, but rather by paying out dividends. The Law on Taxes and 
Duties states that personal and corporate income taxes compose a uniform income tax 
system (Art. 4 (1)) and that the same income cannot be subject to both income taxes - 
corporate and personal - unless explicitly required by law (Art. 4 (4)).  
The EU accession might have positive impact on the development of employee 
participation, including financial participation, but there is no evidence of such 
influence now, with the exception of the statement that practices introduced by 
branches of Western European firms in Latvia could be taken over by domestic 
companies competing with them on human capital. 
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Neither the government nor the social partners presently promote or are planning to 
promote financial participation schemes. The trade unions and other political forces 
which could support such schemes lack knowledge about the methods and advantages 
of financial participation and thus do not even address this issue. High unemployment 
and job uncertainty as well as psychlogically determined inactivity of large groups of 
employees make it still more improbable that employees themselves would promote 
financial participation. However, if an EU regulation on this issue were introduced, it is 
probable that the issue would receive more attention in the future.  
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